




PROJECT MUSE®

Envisioning Multiple Citizenships: West Indian Panamanians
and Creating Community in the Canal Zone Neocolony

Kaysha Corinealdi

The Global South, Volume 6, Number 2, Fall 2013, pp. 87-106 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press



➔ For additional information about this article

<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509589>

Envisioning Multiple Citizenships: West Indian Panamanians and Creating Community in the Canal Zone Neocolony

Kaysha Corinealdi

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the communities created by West Indian Panamanians in the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Zone from the 1930s to the 1950s. Neither nationalist nor diplomatic initiatives could supplant the rights of West Indian Panamanian Zone residents to forge livelihoods on the Isthmus. Such initiatives also clashed with communal efforts to create alternative understandings of citizenship and home. Policies of population removal and re-education in the Canal Zone, particularly connected to treaty negotiations between Panama and the United States (1953–1955), serve as the backdrop for the analysis. These policies increasingly sought to push out or silence West Indian Panamanian Zone residents. This study traces the history of West Indian Panamanian community formation in the Zone, engaging with the memories of former Canal Zone residents. Speeches and letters by community leaders are carefully deconstructed to provide a counter-narrative to government reports and commentary by the Panamanian media on the “problem” of West Indian Panamanians. So doing, the piece touches on the evolution of the practice of citizenship and living “active lives” among West Indian Panamanians by the end of the 1950s.

Bernice Alder was born and raised in the Panama Canal Zone, spending the first thirty years of her life as a daughter, teacher and friend in this space. Alder’s parents were born in Barbados. Her father worked on the maintenance of the Canal, and her mother raised Alder and her ten other siblings while also

earning money by mending, sewing, and undertaking other domestic tasks for neighbors and friends. Alder and her siblings formed part of a large group of people of color who, after 1915, and at the end of the Panama Canal construction, claimed the Canal Zone as home. Indeed, by 1930, people of color comprised a little over fifty percent of the total Panama Canal Zone population of 39,467 (PCZ Census 2, 6).¹ Furthermore, according to Zone census data, twenty-six percent of this population had been born in the Canal Zone. Most had West Indian parents, mainly from Barbados and Jamaica, while others had Panamanian parents. By 1940, the population of whites in the Zone, for the first time, outnumbered that of blacks, 32,856 to 18,524 (much of this increase in the white population reflected a growth in military personnel) (6). Nonetheless, by this time a black community was a reality in the Zone, with Alder and her siblings forming part of this group.

The children of West Indians were among the first generation of blacks born in the Canal Zone.² Though born in a sovereign U.S. space, these children were not considered U.S. citizens or dual/multi U.S.-Panamanian-British citizens. Instead, they were referred to as “alien” by U.S. officials and considered potential citizens of Panama, as the Canal Zone was located in Panamanian territory. These Canal Zone-born West Indian Panamanians spent most of their lives within the U.S. neocolony, obtaining their education and securing employment and housing, when available, therein. Here they also forged friendships, met their first sweethearts, attended church, organized social outings, and joined mutual aid associations and labor unions.

Outside of these associations and organizations, one particular reality bonded all West Indian Panamanians seeking to create communities in the Canal Zone – the existence of citizenship and race-based segregation. The “gold and silver rolls” system, the official U.S. employment policy in the Canal Zone (renamed the U.S. Rate/Local Rate system in 1948), paid “gold/U.S.” workers four times the salary of “silver/non-white/local” workers. Furthermore, whites and people of color in the Zone were not to share the same social or residential spaces. Nonetheless, black workers and their children routinely made their way through white towns as they headed to work and school. As a result, within white towns, “silver” signs designated the cafeterias, water fountains, and restrooms “non-whites” could use (Westerman, “Gold vs. Silver,” 94–5; Biesanz 25; Conniff 121–22).³

Given the extensive segregation in the Canal Zone, one wonders why people of color chose to stay at all. Most blacks working in this territory, it should be noted, did not live there, instead calling Colón and Panama City, the two major Panamanian cities bordering the Canal Zone, home. Those who accepted assigned housing in the Zone, however, did so because they viewed this space as their rightful home.⁴ In what follows, I trace the history of West Indian Panamanian community making in the Canal Zone. In particular, this

essay emphasizes the importance of the post-1935 generation and the Canal Zone Colored Schools to this process. I focus on these latter institutions because almost all West Indian Panamanians born in the Zone attended these learning centers. For many, they served as conduits for professional work and for (re)defining citizenship opportunities.

I also review two Canal Zone policies introduced in early 1954: depopulation and school conversion. Both policies sought to reduce the presence and cultural self-identity of West Indian Panamanian Zone residents. The last section of this article centers on debates about language, assimilation, and the making of “good citizens,” in which government officials and members of the media addressed the future prospects of West Indian Panamanians, as a group, within the Republic.⁵ The memories, speeches, private papers, and journalistic writings of West Indian Panamanians also receive attention throughout this piece. Specifically, I explore how West Indian Panamanian Zone residents, as border crossing individuals, advocated for pluralistic understandings of culture, nationalism, and home that both utilized and circumvented accepted definitions of these terms.

CANAL ZONE COLORED SCHOOLS AND THE ADVOCACY OF A NEW GENERATION

Schools for children of color in the Canal Zone were first established in 1905, and continued to operate as segregated institutions until 1954. West Indian Panamanian children, over half of who were born in the Zone, formed the bulk of the school population. Until the early 1930s, most of the teachers in the Colored Schools were West Indian men trained in the West Indies, particularly in Jamaica and Barbados.⁶ There was also a small group of white U.S. teachers who had been trained in the United States. These often served in supervisory positions. By the late 1930s, West Indian Panamanian women and men (some trained in the West Indies, but the vast majority in Panama) would form the bulk of the teaching base (Cook 47; Harper 25; Westerman, “Historical Notes,” 344). These teachers would prove instrumental in shaping the direction of Zone Colored Schools. The activism generated through these schools by educators and labor activists would also provide West Indian Panamanian Zone residents with the needed tools to represent their communities before national and international governing bodies.

Ending after the eighth grade, the curriculum for Zone Colored Schools centered on the “three R’s”: reading, writing and arithmetic. Compared to the education afforded to whites, schooling for children of color lagged in terms of funding, curriculum, teacher-student ratios, and facilities.⁷ Despite these limitations, teachers and parents embraced the opportunities for learning found in these schools. This was especially the case for parents and students residing in the Zone who wanted to avoid possible discrimination in Spanish-only Panamanian

schools (Beecher and Beecher, 10–12). Though the latter had quality curricula, the prospect of admission denials based on West Indians-bias reduced the appeal of these schools. Some West Indian parents working in the Zone, but living in the Republic, also sought out the Zone's schools because they wanted their children to learn in an English-speaking environment. Prior to 1950, Zone schools, like Panamanian public schools, were also tuition-free, a reality working class parents did not take for granted.

Starting in the mid 1930s, Zone Colored Schools began to offer a professionalization track to select West Indian Panamanians. Responding to a shortage of teachers, a growing number of West Indian Panamanian residents over 16 years of age, and petitions from residents, in 1934 officials opened the La Boca Normal School, a 4-year teacher training facility. Among the first cohort of teacher trainees (37 in total) were at least eight West Indian Panamanian women (Cook 49). Teaching, to a large degree, was among the first professional work secured by black women in the Zone. Apart from private tutoring, women who taught in the Zone prior to 1934 were often limited to cooking, sewing, and general homemaking classes. School Zone officials and independent evaluators, including consultants from Columbia University, believed these subjects would best prepare the Zone's black women for future work as domestic servants and cooks (Engelhardt 15–6). The female teachers trained at the Normal, however, would teach core academic subjects in language, math, and social studies (Harper 104–5). During our personal interview, Dorothy Haywood recounted her admittance to the second Normal School class, in 1940:

I was very nervous. There were so many other applicants [male and female, she clarified], including some of my good friends. Once at the school it was great to have Leonor [Jump] as my instructor. We'd grown up together in La Boca, although she was a little older. Not everyone made it through the training. I felt very blessed to have done so.

Ultimately, the need for teachers, and a desire among black women like Haywood (and Leonor Jump before her) for professional work in education, came together to challenge the predominance of men in Zone Colored Schools. Haywood was born and raised in the Canal Zone, and was the first in her family to attain a professional degree. In this way, the Normal School represented a notable advancement in the gender politics of Zone schooling.

A 1938 curriculum, the first of its kind, added further improvements to the system by offering the first official policy on the function and mission of the Zone Colored Schools. This curriculum was compiled by three teachers: Alfred Osborne, a black Antiguan educated in the Zone and the United States; Leonor Jump, who was trained in the Zone and at Panama City's Escuela Normal; and P.S. Martin, trained at the La Boca Normal School. Beginning in

1940 these three figures would serve as principal instructors in the Normal School. Throughout the decade, these and other educators born in the Canal Zone would also advocate for more opportunities and advancements for West Indian Panamanians within and outside of this territory (Harper 204; Conniff 92–5; Alder; Haywood).

The 1938 curriculum touched upon civics, social responsibilities, economics, and recreational outlets, all topics viewed as essential for the proper educating of Zone Colored School students. On the topic of civics, students were asked to recognize themselves as “world citizens” and as citizens of Panama, as well as to respect the Canal Zone government. This focus on world citizenship possibly had connections to the universalist mantra employed by West Indians and West Indian Panamanians who embraced a Pan-Africanist history including Garveyism, as well of those who formed part of a black international press. A number of branches of Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) flourished in Panama from the 1920s through the 1950s, with a select few continuing after this time. Additionally, since the late 1920s the work of *The Panama Tribune*, the largest West Indian Panamanian-run newspaper, had connected happenings in Panama to a broader hemispheric and global sensibility.⁸

Preparations for the Second World War likewise coincided with advancements within the Zone Colored Schools. West Indian Panamanian educators in these schools used the wartime financial boom to organize a teachers union and to request greater educational and funding opportunities. Edward Gaskin, a Canal Zone-born West Indian Panamanian, along with other graduates of the Normal School and more tenured teachers, created the Canal Zone Colored Teachers Association in 1942. After 1943, teachers received their first raises and, when able to secure scholarships or personal financing, had access to further educational training in Panama and the United States (Harper 165–67).

The work of these teachers and their supporters combined to usher in significant changes in the Canal Zone Colored Schools. The first of these changes came in 1946 when the Zone governor added \$600,000 to the “colored schools” budget – the largest such addition at the time, albeit still a small amount compared to allocations for white schools. With these funds, old school buildings were remodeled and Zone officials finally opened two occupational high schools for “colored students,” one in La Boca and the other in Silver City. The focus on “occupational” rather than “vocational” was meant to assure students that their training would provide them with access to jobs both within and outside of the Zone. Newly available night classes allowed high school seniors to alternate between classroom work and full-time employment. Plans for a Colored Junior College, which opened four years later, also proceeded in the late 1940s. Eventually replacing the Normal School, La Boca Junior College offered two educational tracks: teacher training and a two-year

general liberal arts education. Economics partly explained the construction of the high schools; Zone officials could therein train a new cohort of workers. However, intense campaigning by West Indian Panamanians also played an important role in the creation of both the high schools and the junior college (“Petition for a High School” *The Panama Tribune*, 6; “Capsule History” *Canal Zone Junior College Spotlight*, 1; Harper 144–45, 165–72).

Advocates for these advancements in Zone education ultimately recognized that West Indian Panamanians sought to live active lives in the Canal Zone, in the Republic, and possibly outside of Panama. Having the option of working and living in multiple spaces, and embracing multiple citizenships, stood at the center of what living “active lives” was all about. Zone occupational high schools, in addition to imparting the vocational and professional skills necessary for Zone employment, also facilitated, via specific courses, a more streamlined Panamanian-citizenship acquisition process. A 1946 Panamanian Nationality Law required all children born of foreign parents, even as most of these children were West Indian Panamanians, prove their “integration into the Republic” (Constitución 1946, 4). This law followed a 1941 Constitutional Amendment, revoked in 1946, which denationalized children of “prohibited immigrants,” with particular emphasis placed on the descendants of West Indians (Constitución 1941, 5).⁹ Based on the 1946 law, birth-based citizenship could technically not be revoked, but failure to “prove integration” – i.e., speak Spanish and know Panamanian history – could mean a prolonged delay in obtaining official documents such as identity cards (*cédulas*) and passports. Securing employment or international travel without either document would likewise prove impossible. Through Zone Schools, West Indian Panamanians not only assisted a younger generation in accessing these documents, but also provided them with career training they could use in whichever spaces they chose to make home.

Surviving as black men and women in the Zone, and throughout the Republic, meant embracing all opportunities for progress and change, notwithstanding inconsistencies regarding citizenship and allegiance. Through membership in a Teacher’s Association, and later in Local 713 and Local 900, two labor unions affiliated with the CIO-Congress of Industrial Organizations, West Indian Panamanians sought another form of community assurance: obtaining the securities entitled to those working for the U.S. government. Undoubtedly, although many recognized the contradictions between their citizenship and place of residence and employment, they faced these as a reality of their experience. Particularly for those residing in the Canal Zone, living in this space provided them with a valuable lesson about self-sufficiency and the limits of U.S. and Panamanian democracy.

Thus, by the start of the Remón-Eisenhower Panama Canal Treaty discussions in 1953, the West Indian Panamanian communities of the Canal

Zone had decades of experience negotiating nationalist agendas while also advocating for community-specific aims. These treaty discussions were in fact backed by the on-the-ground work of labor and educational leaders, who had consistently pushed for improvements in Canal Zone policies. Educators, some of whom were also labor leaders, stood at the helm of this leadership base. What these leaders could not control, however, was the label of “outsider” increasingly imposed on the West Indian Panamanian Zone community by fellow Panamanian citizens. They also had very little time to prepare for the drastic changes planned for the Canal Zone by U.S. officials.

DEPOPULATION AND SCHOOL CONVERSION

Talk of substantially reducing the number of non-U.S. citizen workers residing within the Canal Zone began circulating in 1952 with the inauguration of John Seybold, the new area governor. Largely due to the 1940 boom in the white U.S. population in the Canal Zone, white residents had already begun to outnumber residents of color. Although the depopulation policy also helped preserve this territory as a white U.S. space, the official rationale given for the post-1950 reduction centered on cutting costs.¹⁰ Another “cost-cutting” policy measure included scaling back on Zone Colored Schools by limiting their access to the children of workers residing in the area (prior to 1950 residency was not a requirement), and converting the white and colored Canal Zone school system to a U.S. and Latin American school system. Within the new school structure, only U.S. citizens would attend U.S. schools, while Panamanians and all other non-U.S. citizens would attend Latin American Schools. This new system would also supposedly reassure the Panamanian Republic that it still had full autonomy over its citizens in the Zone.

Seybold, perhaps desiring to maintain peaceful relations with his non-US citizen employees and their advocates, delayed initial moves towards either the depopulation or conversion policies. Instead he enforced the existing policy of expelling local rate workers upon their retirement and of leaving school policy decisions to the director of the Division of Schools. By late 1953, however, and with the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty discussions underway, Seybold began to brainstorm with other officials, including State Department officials, on Zone “depopulation.” In Seybold’s view, Panama’s demand for the return of land no longer needed for Canal operations served as a way to also “return” non-US citizen employees to Panama (U.S. Dept. of State, *Memo*).

Seybold was less forthcoming on the topic of school conversion. Recognition that such a conversion ignored desegregation mandates likely explained this approach. School desegregation was not an official Panamanian treaty demand, but instead was the result of U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s enforcement of a 1948 executive order pertaining to racial integration of mili-

tary bases. As a militarized space, albeit with a fully functioning colonial government, the Canal Zone would have to adhere to this provision.¹¹

West Indian Panamanians, and all others within the Republic, learned of both the depopulation and school conversion plans in mid March 1954. Seybold, speaking before the U.S. House Appropriations Committee on March 11, presented his plan to reduce Zone expenses by relocating to Panama most, if not all, of the non-US citizen workers residing in the Zone. Relocation became Seybold's public term for Zone depopulation. The first such relocation, he announced, would include the transfer of local rate workers and their families from the Zone town of Silver City/Rainbow City to the Panama Canal-operated town of New Cristóbal in Colón ("Governor Seybold's Testimony," *Star & Herald*, 2; "Local-Rate Site," *Star & Herald*, 1).

Panamanian news reports on the upcoming "transfer" (and depopulation in general) ranged from a discussion of logistics to conclusions that relocation would be "dangerous," given that those being transferred were "aliens and Panamanians of West Indian origin who lack[ed] even the most remote concept of local customs" ("May Eliminate Native Workers," *The Panama Tribune*, 1; "Local Rate Site," *Star & Herald*, 1; "Protest Against Transfer," *The Nation*, 3). None of the reports included the opinions of those soon to be "relocated," and none seriously questioned whether racism and xenophobia informed the depopulation policy itself, or the reactions within Panama to the policy.

Perhaps seeking to avoid the media inquiry that followed his relocation news, and in the hopes of approaching a "friendly" Panamanian audience, Seybold used a planned appearance at the Panama Rotary Club (an exclusive association of Panamanian politicians and wealthy businessmen) to announce his school conversion plans.¹² According to Seybold, the conversion was meant to finally address the failure of Zone schools to prepare Panamanian children for their role as Panamanian citizens. "We must orient this student to his future—culturally and socially," he declared, "and it must be realized that his future is conjoined with his citizenship" (Seybold 1). To this end, from the 1954–1955 academic school year on, the newly named Latin American Schools would adhere to Panamanian curricula, with the goal of a total conversion by 1955. To streamline the process and keep costs down, classroom sizes would be reduced and all non-resident students would go on a wait list. In his speech, Seybold mentioned having the support of a number of West Indian Panamanian citizens, and shared his firm belief that the conversion plan would give the affected children a chance to "build a better world" (4–5, 8).

West Indian Panamanians living and working in the Zone expressed no such enthusiasm for Seybold's school conversion or depopulation pronouncements. Teachers, in particular, cautioned against the speed of the school conversion. The Local 900 leadership also warned that Seybold's policy initiatives had widespread implications for those within and outside of the Zone ("Canal

Zone Teachers,” *The Panama Tribune*, 1, 8). Gaskin, as representative of the Local 900 membership, wrote to Panamanian President José Remón, outlining how both depopulation and school conversion, if not properly reviewed, could bankrupt the Republic fiscally and morally. The relocation plan, Gaskin explained, combined with the lack of a retirement policy for non-US citizen workers and plans to drastically reduce services for this population, would guarantee increased unemployment and homelessness. Zone relocation, Gaskin concluded, only furthered the economic goals of the Canal Company, and did so “at the expense of human beings and our country.” In choosing to use “our country” and “our government,” Gaskin made clear that he was speaking as a Panamanian citizen on behalf of his fellow citizens and of his country (Gaskin 1–2). Interestingly, as a teacher, Gaskin helped promote the idea of world citizenship in his classroom (Evans). Yet, as a labor and community activist he used, albeit for the benefit of his community, a traditional interpretation of citizenship. Specifically, he affirmed the need for allegiance to a single nation-state, in this case, Panama. Quite possibly he viewed this approach as the best means of gaining the full support of the Panamanian government.

Regarding the school conversion plan, Gaskin expressed outrage, denouncing its racist connotations. As an appointed principal within the Zone Colored Schools, and as someone who had been bypassed in all talks of the conversion, Gaskin had reason to be upset. His complaints, however, had less to do with the language or curriculum change, but instead with what he viewed as an attempt by Zone officials to “get out of educating any of our citizens.” As a result, these students would be pushed into overcrowded elementary and secondary schools in the Republic. “We [L900],” Gaskin declared, “fail to see the humanity and justice of such a move at this particular time.” He pointed out the ways the conversion would allow officials to “avoid ultimate integration in the Canal Zone Schools” (Gaskin 2–3). On the topic of race and racism, Gaskin noted that,

It is strangely significant that local rate children shall be denied Junior College education next year even though their parents live and work on the Zone; yet, offspring of white Panamanian well-to-do families who are non-employees and non-residents of the Zone continue to attend the U.S. rate schools. This might well be a sinister and subtle maneuver to continue the vicious practice of injecting the virus of racial intolerance into the body politic of the Panamanian nation and thus divide its citizenry against each other? (3)

Gaskin quite openly addressed how racism operated in the Canal Zone and in the Panamanian Republic. Wealth and whiteness allowed for the advancement of elite Panamanians within the Zone. Black students, on the other hand, due to racism faced restrictions in their progress. While these students

could try to enroll at the Universidad de Panamá, something Gaskin himself did in the 1930s, Gaskin's critique suggested that the Zone's black students were being unjustly punished for factors outside of their control: the color of their skin, their lack of family wealth, and the place they called home. What role Panama played in the discrimination of black students—and the Republic's other students of color, especially those from the working and middle classes—was not addressed in Gaskin's letter. Instead, he referenced the pervasiveness of U.S. racial intolerance in Panama, suggesting that its continued presence and expansion could lead to national disunity.

Gaskin's approach embraced a discourse commonly employed within Panamanian political circles: blaming the United States and the Canal Zone in particular, for most of the Republic's racism. Per this rationale, the institutionalized nature of U.S. racial segregation supposedly made other forms of discrimination more tame and controllable by comparison. Women and men in the Republic, who faced discrimination in housing, employment, and education on the basis of their background, skin color, and income would have challenged this assumption. Gaskin may have possibly agreed with them. Considering to whom Gaskin sent his letter, and that it was written on behalf of thousands of workers and their families, a focus on U.S.-style discrimination nevertheless made strategic sense.

Describing three conditions under which Local 900 would “be happy to endorse th[e] proposed exodus from the Zone of local rate workers,” Gaskin closed his letter on a note that mixed resignation with negotiation. These conditions included a “doubling or tripling of salaries” to absorb the higher cost of living in the Republic; an agreement from the “Canal Zone government and the U.S. government to cooperate with Panama in planning and financing low-cost housing to accommodate local rate workers” before any removal efforts began; and a promise by the Panamanian government from that day forward to begin plans for the educational, health, and welfare needs of those workers and families who would be “transplanted” (4).

Gaskin's use of the term “exodus,” and his sardonic exercising of the word “happy,” revealed both his and Local 900's continued opposition to the relocation plan, as well as their recognition that their proposals would likely go ignored, particularly by the Canal Zone government. As noted by another Zone resident writing to the English-language Panamanian daily *The Nation* in late April, the national press and Canal Zone officials had already succeeded in “stifl[ing] the voice” of those concerned about the relocation and school conversion plans (Jones, “Zonian Indicts”). Considering these options, it appeared that the future of West Indian Panamanians in the Zone depended on the position taken by the Panamanian government in the continuing treaty negotiations.

A NEW TREATY AND A CONVERTED CANAL ZONE

The Panamanian Negotiating Mission, composed of Panamanian government officials appointed to negotiate the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty, offered a tentative answer to the points raised by concerned West Indian Panamanian Zone residents and by the Local 900 leadership.¹³ The Mission remained committed to the goal of acquiring a just wage system for Panamanian Zone workers but expressed no convictions regarding depopulation. Indeed, after having used information provided by Gaskin and Local 900 to secure agreements on wages and labor equality from the U. S. delegates (agreements that the union would find lacking), the Mission ultimately approached depopulation as an issue that Panamanian Zone workers would have to address on their own (*Misión, Informe Quinta Reunión; U.S., Fifth Meeting*). Furthermore, even after ratification of the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty, West Indian Panamanians in the Zone had to contend with changes in the Canal Zone and Panama that challenged their sense of community and their particular interpretations of citizenship.

Contrary to the recommendations of Local 900, the Panamanian Mission did not suggest an exact level of salary increase nor did the members of the Mission inquire about United States financing for the housing costs or general welfare needs of those to be relocated.¹⁴ As the treaty talks continued, proposals of United States' fiscal responsibility were replaced with references to the relocated workers and residents as burdens. According to the members of the Mission, the Panamanian government's main hesitancy with the relocation plan rested on the large number of transferees, as well as the Republic's limited resources for social welfare and housing needs. The services the Panamanian state could offer these workers, they affirmed, far surpassed these workers' tax contributions to the state. Panama, the Mission representatives concluded, would now have to "shoulder the burden" of dealing with "a problem" created by the United States. Based on these pronouncements, relocated workers had transformed from workers seeking just wages into an amorphous mass about to weigh down the Panamanian Republic (*Misión, Informe Vigésima, 2-4*).

The bulk of the treaty negotiations between Panama and the United States ended in late August 1954. By December, both governments announced the impending signing of what would be the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty. In between the end of negotiations and the announcement of a final treaty draft, the Panamanian government offered few details on the impact the treaty would have on Panamanian Canal Zone workers and their families. Addressing the nation following completion of the treaty draft in late December, President Remón also remained silent about these workers and Zone residents. Instead, he commented on the nation's economic future beyond its alliance with the United States. According to Remón, the Treaty for Mutual Understanding and Cooperation (the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty),

and the adjoining Memorandum signified great things for the Panamanian nation. The signed treaty and an increased focus on the Republic's "complete economic independence," Remón insisted, would ensure Panama's continued progress. Politics and productivity beyond the Panama Canal topped the list of upcoming priorities for the Remón administration. Significantly, representatives of the West Indian Panamanian Zone communities, unlike members of the Panamanian Chamber of Commerce, industrialists, newspapers publishers, and Rotary and Lions Club members, had not been invited to discuss with President Remón the final aspects of the treaty ("Terminan las negociaciones, *La Estrella de Panamá*, 1, 4; Meyer, 1, 8; "Press Reflects," *The Panama Tribune*, 1-2).

Unfortunately, neither Local 900 members nor other Zone workers and residents had an opportunity to present Remón with their concerns. Two days into the new year, Remón was assassinated.¹⁵ Amidst public mourning and ongoing investigations into the assassination, arrangements for the signing of the treaty progressed as planned. On January 25, 1955, the governments of Panama and the United States signed the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty. Politicians and journalists alike presented the signed treaty as the best way to honor Remón's legacy. Shortly thereafter, the Panamanian government ratified the 1955 Treaty ("El nuevo tratado," *El Panamá América*, 2; Westerman, "Remon-Eisenhower Treaty," 8).

In a national radio address three months following the ratification, Gas-kin revealed much of the apprehension West Indian Panamanian Zone residents still felt about changes taking place in the Canal Zone and the implementation of the 1955 Treaty. He expressed great sadness at the closing of three local rate towns – Red Tank, his birthplace, Gatún and Pedro Miguel – and the planned closure of La Boca, as part of the depopulation policy (Gas-kin, Radio Address; "High School Goes," *The Panama Tribune*, 1). The scheduled dismantling of La Boca was particularly significant because, in the 1930s and 1940s, it was considered the most populous and dynamic of the Canal Zone local rate towns. Here, the Normal School first opened its doors. Here a clubhouse and commissary had serviced thousands. Haywood, who was born in La Boca and lived there until 1950, remembered the poetry nights, mock debates, and dances coordinated in the town. John Evans, also a former resident of La Boca, spoke of the natural beauty of his birthplace and his deep belief that Zone officials had not wanted black people to enjoy such a space. He left the Zone in 1956, he told me, before he had to witness the end of La Boca. The passage of time and migration to a new place may have heightened Evans' nostalgia for La Boca. On the other hand, as Evans also noted, Zone officials did eventually build homes and recreational facilities for white U.S. workers over what had been the local rate town of La Boca (Donoghue 21).

Along with depopulation and disappointing treaty provisions, another major change awaiting West Indian Panamanians was the push for rapid integration in

the Canal Zone and the Republic. Whereas in the past, creating community within the markers of more than one nation-state had been a necessity, after 1955, official bodies and select West Indian Panamanian leaders alike promoted assimilation and integration as the means of progress. In this way, integration, whether into a national or neocolonial standard, stripped the validity of community experiences as platforms for collective identity. This rhetoric of integration, not surprisingly, left unexamined the deeply rooted issues of racism and inequality in the Canal Zone and Panamanian Republic.

The school conversion program initiated by the Canal Zone government in 1954, as well as the close observation of the new “Latin American Schools” by the Panamanian media and select experts, exemplified this push from the communal to the nationalist. That is, the conversion program insisted on the need for a carefully delineated national identity, one based on a specific linguistic and cultural practice. To be Panamanian would mean speaking Spanish and aligning with all things “Latin.” Speaking English, in turn, became a specific U.S. privilege, which elite Panamanians would also secure. Ironically, under the banner of Latin American Schools, U.S. officials pushed forth a homogenous representation of Panama that shared many similarities with the discriminatory principles of the 1941 Panamanian Constitution. The comments surrounding the validity of Latin American Schools also revealed the continued push for a homogenous Panama among certain sectors of the Panamanian population.

As early as April 1954, critics of the conversion plan focused on the linguistic abilities and national affiliations of the teachers in the new school system. A contributor to the newsweekly *El Panamá América* warned that “foreign teachers” would be instructing students in the Latin American Schools. In reality, West Indian Panamanians remained the majority of the teacher base for these schools. To fully assimilate West Indian descendants, the writer insisted, their teachers would need to have learned Spanish, “Panamanian Spanish,” since infancy. Otherwise a “corruption of the Spanish language” and the Republic’s history could ensue (Sánchez, “La educación”). Professors and deans from the Universidad de Panamá also warned that, due to a continued focus on “American educational approaches,” graduates of the Latin American Schools might have “dialects, mannerisms and political views” that contradicted with those of “true Panamanians” (Jamieson, “Panama University” 1, 8–9). Students graduating from the Zone Latin American Schools, in other words, could potentially corrupt the Panamanian polity.

Other commentaries on the Latin American Schools focused on the “language problems” of the students within these schools (Duque, “Teaching Spanish” 1; “Failure for ‘L.A. Schools,’” *The Panama Tribune*, 1–2). Reporters from *El Panamá América* paid a visit to a La Boca Elementary School as part of their coverage of the inauguration of the Latin American Schools system. According to the reporters, the teachers in the classrooms they visited, all women, were

making an honest effort to teach solely in Spanish. Some students, they reported, were struggling to keep up; as evidence, the reporters pointed to notebook headings (denoting the date and year) written in English. As a visual component to the article, *El Panamá América* printed the picture of a young black girl, deep in concentration, writing in her notebook. Part of the caption to the picture read: "Many students, like this one, try their best to understand the orientation of our language, certain that they will soon master it" ("El problema," *El Panamá América*, n.p.). The decision by the *Panamá América* to photograph a little girl and include this caption pointed once more to the gendered nature of discussions about education, nationalism, and assimilation. Seybold, in his announcement of the creation of the Latin American Schools, had gendered all the students/"future citizens of Panama," as male. The *Panamá América* piece, in turn, suggested that the true adaptability of West Indian Panamanians rested in little girls and female teachers in schools like La Boca Elementary. Their success, or failure, would determine whether proper citizens could be made of West Indian descendants in Panama.

The criticisms and observations directed towards the Latin American Schools ultimately failed to recognize the multiple citizenships envisioned by West Indian Panamanian students and teachers in the Canal Zone schools decades before the conversion plans. This push for multiple citizenships included an assertion of communal and civil rights to various parts of the world. In this way, neither discriminatory citizenship laws nor neocolonial regulations could negate the day to day realities of individuals who traversed national and colonial borders on a daily basis, creating home in the various spaces they occupied. During my interview with Haywood, an alumna of the La Boca schools, including the Normal School, and a Zone teacher for fifteen years, she noted that since the late 1930s a number of Panamanians of West Indian descent living in the Canal Zone had, when possible, enrolled their children as students in both the Zone and in the Republic. One of her close friends, she recalled, also a teacher in the Canal Zone, was trained at the Normal School in Santiago, Veraguas. This Veraguas school was financed and coordinated by the Panamanian Ministry of Education. Through the Summer Institutes sponsored by the Junior College, Haywood informed me, Zone teachers also participated in workshops led by professors from the Universidad de Panamá and from the Normal Schools in Panama City and Veraguas. In this way, Zone teachers had, with the support of family and friends, showcased their ability to live and thrive in more than one space or language.

For Alder, who was also educated in La Boca and trained as a teacher at the La Boca branch of the Canal Zone Junior College, the decision to convert to Spanish instruction had been an inevitable one. Alder began her teaching career in the Zone in 1952, and recalled that already many students and teachers were bilingual and recognized the benefits of teaching in and speaking

Spanish. Robert Beecher, one of Alder's teachers and an eventual colleague, obtained teacher training and advanced degrees in Jamaica, Panama and the United States between 1928 and 1950, and was comfortable in both English and Spanish (Beecher, "Resume"). Even Gaskin had enrolled in courses at the Universidad de Panamá, and was not opposed to Spanish training. His main critique of the school conversion centered on its speed, and on exclusions to educational opportunities based on race, income, and residency. These nuanced understandings of education, identity, and access, as defined by Haywood, Alder, Beecher, and Gaskin, did not register with the Canal Zone officials who advocated for a speedy conversion, nor with the Panamanians who critiqued the Zone teachers and students affected by the conversion. As understood by these educators, homogeneity had not and could not ensure the growth of communities of color. Indeed, to thrive in the Canal Zone and elsewhere, West Indian Panamanians had to not only speak more than one language, but also needed to understand the cultural and political complexity of the world they inhabited. They embodied the promises and limits of multiple citizenships. Their experiences allowed them to navigate more than one national history. Yet this very reality also led to problematic questions about the ability of said citizens to be truly loyal to any one nation-state.

For select West Indian Panamanian leaders, assimilation could in time counter any apprehensions held towards West Indian descendants in Panama. George Westerman, a West Indian Panamanian born in Colón and familiar with the Canal Zone, elaborated on such views through his journalistic writings in *The Panama Tribune* and in a number of Spanish language dailies in the Republic. A November 6, 1954 *Tribune* article entitled "Noted Improvements Seen in Panamanian Race Relations," which was reprinted in *La Nación*, *The Nation*, and *El Mundo Gráfico* (Westerman authored the English and Spanish versions of this article), applauded all those Panamanians of West Indian descent who through education, job opportunities, and political engagement had strived to fully incorporate themselves into the Panamanian nation. Through these actions, he affirmed, Panamanians of West Indian descent adamantly sought out their place in "the great Panamanian nation." Not unlike Gaskin, Westerman focused on the positive aspects of Panamanian nationalism. His audience, moreover, was broader and consisted of influential intellectual and political figures throughout the nation. These were the people Westerman sought to reach with his writings. With their support, he believed West Indian Panamanians would finally be afforded the opportunity to fully participate in the nation.

But, did all West Indian Panamanians feel that they could partake in the "incorporation" promoted by Westerman? Already, those residing in the Zone had reason to wonder about their "acceptance" into the Panamanian family. Others outside of the Zone expressed similar concerns. The continued enforcement of the Nationality Law stood out prominently among these concerns. As

discussed earlier, the Nationality Law required the children of foreign-born parents to petition for their citizenship and prove their “incorporation into national life.” Most West Indian Panamanians chose to proceed with the process of acquiring Panamanian citizenship in order to retain their home and community lives in Panama. For West Indian Panamanians fluent in English, with experience working in the Canal Zone, and familiar with U.S. northern cities, however, migration to the United States held particular appeal. As the year 1955 grew to a close and with many changes taking place in the Canal Zone, West Indian Panamanians with the means and opportunity to migrate to the United States gave increased attention to that option. Through migration, these men and women made their own citizenship claims to the United States, further broadening the multiplicity of citizenships available to their still growing diaspora.

CONCLUSION: REMEMBERING THE CANAL ZONE AND ONGOING MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIPS

From the outside, the Canal Zone appeared an especially unwelcoming space for people of color. Zone officials created policies to ensure that non-white and non-U.S. citizens never attained full autonomy in the Canal Zone. That black women and men would also look to the Zone as one of several spaces of home did not register with these officials. Similarly, for Panamanian officials and intellectuals, West Indian Panamanians who had chosen to live in the Zone represented an aberration. By birth they could be considered Panamanian, but in spirit they were perpetual foreigners.

By 1950, West Indian Panamanians in the Zone had nevertheless created stable communities inspired by the idea of multiple citizenships and allegiances. As black women and men who had inherited legacies of migration, and who lived multi-cultural and bi-lingual realities, accepting homogeneity equaled stagnation. To thrive, they had to embrace the histories, both personal and public, that made them unique. These histories called for a global perspective that at times conflicted with national and colonial understandings of home and belonging. Indeed, the advocacy of teachers, labor leaders, and other Zone residents, revealed an unwillingness within these communities to have government officials and outsiders decide the fate of West Indian Panamanians in the Canal Zone.

Yet, even this advocacy increasingly entailed petitioning national governments, and often, being subject to the determinants of nationalist imperatives. During the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty discussions, these imperatives included Panamanian demands for respect of its economic potential and its sovereignty, and U.S. Canal Zone insistence on viewing this area as an imperial white space. Under a xenophobic integrationist premise shared by Canal

Zone and Panamanian officials, West Indian Panamanians were also expected to part ways with a communal view deemed backwards and obsolete. Faced with these alternatives, some West Indian Panamanian Zone residents chose to physically bid goodbye to spaces that no longer resembled what had once been home.

For the former Zone residents who migrated to the United States, and whom I interviewed, the memories of the Canal Zone of the past lived on. Based on their experiences with the Canal Zone Colored Schools, and with restrictive Panamanian nationality laws, they understood that citizenship was as much about birthrights as it was about residency and community. This meant that a West Indian Panamanian community could flourish even outside of the Panamanian Isthmus. Educators like Alder, Jump, Beecher and Hayward would take on this challenge, effectively making spaces like New York City part of an ongoing expansion of the practice of multiple citizenships by West Indian Panamanians.

Notes

I am grateful to Elizabeth W. Son, Marzia Milazzo and Claudia Millan for their generous feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Claudia Millan and Ifeoma Kiddoe Nwankwo for putting together this special issue and allowing me to be a part of the process. My many thanks also go out to the editorial team of *The Global South*.

1. The Canal Zone census defined as “negro and negro-mixed” anyone with African ancestry based on phenotype and parental lineage. I use the terms “black” and “people of color” because I believe both terms leave room for the multiple linguistic, cultural, and migratory histories that I explore in this article.

2. In using the term West Indian I refer to the inhabitants of the Caribbean’s English and French speaking islands. I use the term black to reference a shared Afro-descendant history that connected West Indians, their descendants, and others of African descent in Panama and other parts of the world.

3. For more on the gold/silver roll system in the Canal Zone and segregation in this space, see Velma Newton, *The Silver Men*, 2004; Michael Conniff, *Black Labor*, 1985; and Greene, *The Canal Builders*, 2009.

4. Zone residents, whether U.S. citizens or non-U.S. citizens could not own property in the Zone. Instead all property came under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government vis-à-vis the Canal Zone government.

5. I use the term Republic to reference the non-Canal Zone areas of Panama.

6. A *Panama Tribune* article honoring a group of Colored Zone School teachers retiring in 1954 offers a glimpse into some of these early West Indian educators. Of the eight teachers honored in the article, seven were men and four were born in Jamaica, two in Barbados and one in Trinidad. All had arrived in Panama and the Canal Zone between 1906 and 1920. Each had taught for twenty-four years or more in the Canal Zone. Amabell T. Pattell, the only woman in the group, was the daughter of a schoolmaster in Jamaica. She received her teacher training in Jamaica and was the last of the group to arrive in Panama (“Retirement of Six,” 1, 8–9).

7. For more on the structure of Canal Zone colored schools from 1905 to 1915, see Westerman, "School Segregation," 276–87; Harper, *Tracing the Growth*, chapters II and III; Conniff, *Black Labor*, chapter V.
8. For more on Garveyism and the UNIA in Panama, see Burnett, "Are we Slaves or Free Men?." On the internationalist work of *The Panama Tribune*, see Corinealdi "Redefining Home," especially chapter I.
9. For more on the 1941 denationalization amendment, see Duncan, 71; Conniff 98–9; Durling Arango 53; Siu 114–29; Corinealdi 34–50.
10. The term depopulation was first used by George Goethals, the first governor of the Canal Zone. He used the term to describe the act of purposefully denying housing in the Zone to non-US citizen workers and their families. He pursued an extensive depopulation policy between 1914 and 1925 (Conniff 47).
11. Westerman "End of Segregated Schools," 1, 16; Harper 241; Conniff 121–22; Westerman, "School Segregation," 276–82. Non-U.S. citizen workers had in the late 1940s decried segregation in the Zone but these protests only led to a change in labels, from "silver" to "local rate." In a 1954 study Westerman also noted that the increased presence of black U.S. citizens in the Canal Zone as well as the complaints raised by members of this group regarding discrimination also made Canal Zone school segregation particularly problematic (Westerman, "School Segregation," 281–82).
12. "Seybold to Revise," *Star & Herald*: 1, 7; "Zone Schooling," *The Nation*: 3; "Governor Explains," *The Panama Tribune*: 1, 9.
13. To briefly review, President José Remón Canteras convened the Panamanian Negotiation Mission in September 1953. The purpose of the Mission was to undertake negotiations with designated U.S. officials before the signing of a final treaty between Panama and the United States.
14. Throughout the treaty discussions, depopulation was referred to as relocation.
15. Remón's assassination remains unsolved. Guizado, the Panamanian Vice-President at the time of Remón's assassination, was initially accused of the crime. For more on the assassination, see José Ramón Guizado, *El Extraño Asesinato*; LaRae Pippin, *The Remón Era*; La Feber, 94–5.

Works Cited

- Alder, Bernice. Personal Interview. 24, 30 July, 2008.
- Beecher, Robert. "Resume." Robert Houston Beecher Papers (RHBP): 1. Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture (SCRBC). New York Public Library.
- Beecher, Clarence and Robert Beecher. "Equal Opportunity in Schools of Panamanians of West Indian Descent in the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama, A Comparative Study: 1904–1954." West Indian Association, Second Annual Conference. Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. 2–3 May 1977.
- Biesanz, John. "Race Relations in the Canal Zone." *Phylon*, 11 (1950): 20–33.
- Burnett, Carla. "Are we Slaves or Free Men?: Labor, Race, Garveyism, and the 1920 Panama Canal Strike." Diss. University of Illinois at Chicago, 2004.
- "Canal Zone Teachers Urge Study of Serious Aspects of Changes." *The Panama Tribune*. 28 March 1954: 1, 8.
- "Capsule History of the Canal Zone Junior College's La Boca Branch." *Canal Zone Junior College Spotlight* 16:53. 30 March 1954: 1.
- Constitución de la República de Panamá*. Panamá: Imprenta Nacional, 1941.
- Constitución de la República de Panamá*. Panamá: Imprenta Nacional, 1946.
- Conniff, Michael. *Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904–1981*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985.

- Cook, Katherine M. *Public Education in the Panama Canal Zone*. United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education. Bulletin 1939. Washington: GOP, 1939.
- Corinealdi, Kaysha. "Redefining Home: West Indian Panamanians and Politics of Race, Citizenship, and Diaspora, 1928–1970." Diss. Yale University, 2011.
- Donoghue, Michael E. "Imperial Sunset: Race, Identity, and Gender in the Panama Canal Zone, 1939–1979." Ph.D. Diss. University of Connecticut, 2006.
- Duncan, Quince. *El negro en Panamá*. Quito: Ed-Abya-Yala, 1980.
- Duque, Tomás. "Teaching Spanish in CZ Schools." *The Nation*. 11 August 1954: 1
- Durling Arango, Virginia. *La inmigración prohibida*. Panamá: Publicaciones Jurídicas de Panamá, 1999.
- "El nuevo tratado y los acuerdos adicionales." *El Panamá América*. 25 January 1955: 2.
- "El problema de las escuelas 'Latinoamericanas' es que los alumnos no saben castellano." *El Panamá América*. 10 August 1954: n.p.
- Engelhardt, N. L. *Report of the Survey of the Schools of the Panama Canal Zone*. Mount Hope, Canal Zone: The Panama Canal Press, 1930.
- Evans, John. Personal Interview. 11 July, 2008.
- "Failure for 'L.A.' Schools Predicted." *The Panama Tribune*. 15 August 1954, 1–2.
- Gaskin, Edward A. "Letter to President José A. Remón C." 1954. RHPB: 2.
- . "Radio Address." July 1955. RHBP: 2.
- "Governor Explains Change Over in Schools." *The Panama Tribune*. 21 March 1954: 1, 9.
- "Governor Seybold's Testimony at House Hearing on Panama Canal Budget." *Star & Herald*. 15 March 1954: 2.
- Greene, Julie. *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.
- Guizado, José Ramón. *El extraño asesinato del Presidente Remón*. Barcelona: Editorial Linomono-graph, 1964.
- Harper, Alda. *Tracing the Course and Growth and Development of Educational Policy for the Canal Zone Colored Schools, 1905–1955*. Comparative Education Dissertation Series, 25. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1979.
- Haywood, Dorothy. Personal Interview. 10 August, 2010.
- "High School Goes to Paraiso with Abandoning of La Boca." *The Panama Tribune*. 24 April 1955: 1.
- Jamieson, Jack, "Panama University Professors Discuss Exceptions to New C.Z. School Set-Up." *The Panama Tribune*. 20 June 1954: 1, 8–9.
- Jones, Samuel S. "Zonian Indicts C.Z. Governor, Journals as Fostering Segregation in Schools." *The Nation*. Letters to the Editor. 22 April 1954.
- King, Margaret Lumpkin. *Education in the British West Indies*. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Division of International Education. Washington: GPO, 1955.
- LaFeber, Walter. *The Panama Canal Crisis: The Crisis in Historical Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- "Local-Rate Site in New Cristobal – Rainbow City Families to be Moved There." *Star & Herald*. 18 March 1954: 1.
- "Los resultados del Tratado son de positivos beneficios para Panamá,' Ricardo Arias E." *El Panamá América*. 25 January 1955: 1, 6.
- "May Eliminate Native Workers from Residence on Canal Zone." *The Panama Tribune*. 14 March 1954: 1.
- Meyer, Ben F. "Treaty Negotiations Successfully Ended - Guizado and Chapin Will Sign Document in Panama Early Next Month; Text Not Yet Public." *Star & Herald*. 23 December 1954: 1, 8.
- Misión Panameña. *Informe Quinta Reunión de Negociadores*. 22 September 1954. George Westerman Papers (GWP):82/6. SCRBC.
- . *Informe del Secretario de la Misión Especial Negociadora Panameña sobre la Vigésima Séptima reunión de los Representates de Panamá y los Estados Unidos para revisar las relaciones entre los dos países*. 20 May, 1954, GWP 82/6
- Newton, Velma. *The Silver Men: West Indian Labour Migration to Panama, 1850–1914*. 3rd edn. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1984.

- "Petition for a High School." *The Panama Tribune*. 1 August 1943: 6.
- Pippin, Larry LaRae. *The Remón Era: An Analysis of a Decade Of Events in Panama, 1947–1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- "Press Reflects Satisfaction Over New R.P.-US Treaty." *The Panama Tribune*. 26 December 1954: 1–2.
- "Protest Against Transfer Not Inspired by Racial Prejudice - 'Atlantico.'" *The Nation*. 25 March 1954: 3.
- "Retirement of Six of Canal Zone's Best Known School Teachers." *The Panama Tribune*. 7 March 1954: 1, 8–9.
- Sánchez, Aníbal. "La Educación De Los Ciudadanos Panameños En La Zona Del Canal." *El Panamá América*. 17 April 1954: n.p.
- Seybold, John S. *Speech*. Rotary Club of Panama. Panama City, Panamá. 18 March 1954.
- "Seybold to Revise Local Rate Schools to Suit Panama Needs." *Star & Herald*. 19 March 1954.
- "Terminan las negociaciones del nuevo tratado con EE.UU.; Se firmará en Enero." *La Estrella de Panamá*. 23 December 1954: 1, 4.
- Siu, Lok. *Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- "Terminan las negociaciones del nuevo tratado con EE-UU; Se firmará en Enero." *La Estrella de Panamá*. 23 December 1954: 1, 4.
- United States. Records of the Panama Canal. *Fifth Meeting of Representatives of Panama and the United States Regarding Relations Between the Two Countries*. 22 September 1953. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). RG (Record Group) 185–147.
- . U.S. Census Bureau. *Panama Canal Zone Population - 16th Census of the United States, 1940*. Washington: GPO, 1941.
- . U.S. Department of State. *Call of Governor Seybold Upon Assistant Secretary Cabot*. Memo. 15 December, 1953. NARA. RG 59.
- Westerman, George. "Gold vs. Silver Workers in the Canal Zone." *Common Ground*. Winter 1948: 92–95.
- . "School Segregation on the Panama Canal Zone." *Phylon*, 15 (1954): 276–87.
- . "End of Segregated Schools on Canal Zone Not in Sight Despite Def. Dept. Order." *The Panama Tribune*. 7 February 1954: 1, 8–9.
- . "Remon-Eisenhower Treaty Before National Assembly for its Ratification." *The Panama Tribune*. 6 February 1955.
- . "Noted Improvements Seen in R.P. Race Relations." *The Panama Tribune*. 6 November 1955: 11.
- . "Panama Race Relations Consistently Improving." *The Nation*. 9 November 1955.
- . "La integración racial de nuestra patria mejorará notablemente." *El Mundo Gráfico*. 26 November 1955: 2.
- . "Historical Notes on West Indians on the Isthmus of Panama." *Phylon* 22:4 (1961), 340–50
- "Zone Schooling for Panamans [sic] was Failure' Seybold Says." *The Nation*. 21 March 1954: 7.